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Some Observations on China’s
Economic Transformation
Vasant A. Sukhatme

I

n recent months I have made several trips to the Wal-Mart store
near my home, to purchase a smoke detector for the upstairs hallway,
an electric iron, a no-frills DVD player, and a pump sprayer for use in
our flower garden. Every item I purchased was made in China. The
range of products coming out of China in recent years leads even a
casual observer to sit up and take notice of the country where such
products are made and understand the story behind its remarkable
transformation from a poor, closed economy to a rising market-based
economy over the past three decades. My participation in Macalester’s
recent Faculty Development International Seminar provided me with
a great opportunity to visit China and increase my appreciation of its
economic transformation.1 This essay reports my understanding of the
Chinese story. I have long taught and researched issues in economic
development and tried to understand why some countries grow faster
than others over long periods of time. My visit to China reinforced my
concern and interest in this subject.
In an earlier era, Japan’s economic rise after the Second World War
was characterized as an economic miracle. Subsequently, in the 1970s
and 1980s, the growth record of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Hong Kong came to be hailed as economic miracles. But the performance of all of these countries pales in comparison to China’s growth
record after its economic reforms of 1978. China is the economic miracle par excellence. China’s economy grew at a more rapid rate for more
years than any other country in all of recorded history. By all the usual
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measures—real per capita income, life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, adult literacy rate, or the Human Development Index—the
Chinese people are significantly better off than they were just three
decades ago. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong
all grew by becoming more fully integrated into the world economy
and by changing the institutional framework under which economic
agents, including those in various levels of government, undertook
decisions. So too has been the story of China.
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 and the Communist Party moved very quickly to model its development strategy
on the Soviet model (plan). By the mid-1950s, the public sector owned
all the assets in the country; central planning and the accompanying
price rigidities and allocation mechanisms were well in place; and the
Communist Party had assumed complete control over all economic
activity. State-owned enterprises were required to meet output and
delivery goals set by the central authorities, and prices ceased to play
any role in allocating resources among alternative uses. State investment was directed overwhelmingly to the industrial sector though, to
be sure, the government did invest in inputs for agriculture, such as
fertilizer and agricultural machinery. The development strategy was
focused on developing heavy industry to achieve self-reliant growth
and was inward looking; it was also divorced from the realities of a
price system and involved extensive administrative controls on foreign
exchange and credit. The outcome was inevitable and entirely predictable. In the mid-1970s, China remained very poor and by the end of
the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution (in the mid-1970s) it
was clear to many within China that the country had fallen substantially behind its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and, of
course, Japan, who had all made rapid progress by greater reliance
on the price system and the world economy. The first tentative steps
toward economic reforms took place in 1978 and, since then, remarkable change has occurred that has transformed the lives of many hundreds of millions of its people.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section I provides
a broad overview of the transition process, along with the key dates
when significant changes occurred. In Section II, I draw lessons from
the Chinese experiment, the most important of which is that China
was able to effect momentous change relatively smoothly and without
much opposition from interest groups impacted by policy changes.
Section III highlights some important challenges that face China.
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I. Phases of Reform
It has long been said that much of economics can be put in a simple
sentence: people respond to incentives. Under the right reward structure, people and even government entities can work miracles. But the
connection between economic policies and economic growth is not
simple or direct; some kinds of economic policies can be conducive to
economic growth while others can be harmful to it. There are many
examples of countries in all parts of the world where bad policies have
caused economic ruin. Bad policies create distortions that stand in the
way of efficient resource use. These distortions mainly affect the level
of economic activity and the resulting output, not its rate of growth over
time. The rate of growth is affected as the economy moves from one
level of activity to another. Policy changes do not generally influence
rates of growth. That is not to say that the effects of policy reforms are
not important; indeed, a series of policy reforms will add up to enormous consequences. This is precisely what happened in China, where
the policymakers were willing to change the economic institutions in
place for decades (for example, collectives in agriculture), and enabled
the establishment of special economic zones in the southern and coastal
areas, financed in large part by foreign direct investments.
In a broad sense, China’s economic transformation has followed
a “dual-track” system, which may well be the main reason behind
its huge success. The dual-track system works as follows: (a) under
the “plan track,” agricultural communes or households or industrial
firms are required to deliver specified amounts of output to government authorities (as established in the existing plans) at predetermined
prices, and (b) under the “market track,” these economic agents can
sell their output on the open market at whatever price the output
will fetch once they have satisfied their plan obligations. Further, under
the dual-track approach, economic agents receive input allocations
from plan authorities at pre-set input prices but may purchase additional amounts on the open market. Researchers have shown that as
long as the pre-existing plan is feasible and continues to be enforced,
the dual-track approach to market liberalization is efficient and Paretoimproving.2
The intuition behind this is straightforward: the introduction of a
market track provides an opportunity for economic agents to become
better off, and the maintenance of the plan track protects the statusquo rents under the existing plan. The maintenance of the plan track
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provides stability and predictability while the market track provides
incentives at the margin. This is also the reason why opposition to the
dual-track approach is likely to be minimal at the start of reforms, and
also why, once reforms have begun, there is likely to be minimal pressure to reverse the reforms. A dual-track system was established not
only in agriculture, but also in industry and in the fiscal system.
Economic reform began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Communist Party Congress in December 1978 and has gone through several
phases since then. The first reform was in agriculture in 1978. This was
the first application of the dual-track approach and it signaled a significant reorientation in the strategy of economic development. The key
administrative unit in Chinese collectivized agriculture was the commune. The central plan authority allocated inputs to each commune
and determined what and how much should be produced. In return,
the communes were obligated to deliver to the government specified
quantities at predetermined prices. Policymakers had recognized early
on the inefficiency of the system and concluded that existing price
policies had created large disincentives in agriculture. To address these
problems, the central government raised prices for mandatory deliveries and directed greater state investment into agriculture, thereby
reducing the effective tax rate on agriculture. Simultaneously, and
more importantly, the central government leadership allowed, even
if somewhat reluctantly at the beginning, a greater degree of institutional flexibility by permitting the “household responsibility system”
throughout large areas of the country. Under the household responsibility system, land that had been previously farmed collectively in
communes was distributed equally to households (adjusting for size of
household and age of its members) who obtained long-term use-rights
to the land; households were then responsible for delivering specified
amounts to the commune and could keep for themselves all additional
output that they produced. This was effectively the de-collectivization of agriculture, a repudiation of the existing institutions in agriculture, and a return to private farming.3 It is important to note that the
household responsibility system arose at the commune level and not
at the central government’s initiative. In fact, the central government
opposed the new institutional arrangement and even as late as 1982
continued to view the collective as the key to increasing agricultural
output. In any event, once the household responsibility system became
established in one part of the country, it quickly spread. There was an
immediate impact on output and agricultural incomes.
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The spectacular success in agriculture provided important support for reform in other sectors of the economy. Rising agricultural
incomes would be spent on consumer goods and the availability of
these goods had to increase, both by greater domestic production but
also by imports. Increased domestic production of consumer goods
also enabled the absorption of the growing labor force. The increased
domestic output came from the establishment of new private enterprises as well as enterprises set up by local governments (“township
and village enterprises,” or TVEs). The TVEs were the mainspring of
industrial reform and growth.
The dual-track approach was also adopted for industrial and manufactured products. In the pre-reform era, industrial enterprises were
assigned output and delivery targets, just as was the system in agriculture. Industrial reforms first began on an experimental basis in Sichuan
Province but quickly spread to other places. The key aspect of these
reforms is that industrial enterprises were given significant autonomy
in output and investment decisions but were not privatized (which is
what had effectively occurred in agriculture). In the mid 1980s, state
enterprises came to be subject to a “contract responsibility system.”
Each enterprise signed a contract with the relevant level of government
(state or central, depending on control) under which the enterprise
turned over a fixed annual tax and could retain any remaining profits.
Enterprises were also given the discretion to sell any additional output,
beyond the planned output, in the open market. These institutional
changes paralleled the changes in agriculture.
At the time when economic reforms began, state-owned enterprises
produced about 75 percent of the industrial output in the country
and employed about 70 percent of all industrial employees. Since then
the state sector has decreased considerably and now must compete
with privately owned firms for resources and labor. Many small-sized
state enterprises have been privatized, although the state has retained
ownership of the large- and medium-sized firms. State-owned enterprises continue to be overstaffed and cannot easily get rid of excess
workers. Their share of industrial output has fallen more sharply than
their share of industrial employment.4 Removing barriers to entry by
domestic and foreign firms has promoted competition and raised productivity.
The “special economic zones” provide another application of the
dual-track approach, even if the strategy of establishing these zones
was “unbalanced” in the traditional sense in development econom-
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ics. The government knew that these zones had the potential to create
regional disparities but decided that the receipt of foreign funds and
technology carried a bigger benefit in the long run. Indeed, the distinguished Chinese-American economist Gregory Chow noted that these
special economic zones also served as experiments for skeptical Party
members who were wary of foreign investments in China.5 Ultimately,
these zones were established because they lay outside the plan-track
and did not affect planned production and allocation, and thereby
were Pareto-improving. They also came to symbolize the new, open
direction in China’s economic development. China established four
special economic zones in Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai in the southern
province of Guangdong, and Xiamen in Fujian province. The central
government allowed a great deal of autonomy to the zones, such as the
approval of foreign investment projects and also in terms of tax revenues generated in these zones. Firms in these zones were free to set
their own wage and employment conditions and also received favorable tax treatment. These economic zones turned out to be very successful in attracting foreign investments, and by the late 1990s many
other such zones had been established.
In the pre-reform era, the Chinese economy was characterized by
low levels of monetization, not just because of the overall low level
of economic development but because the economy had essentially
no capital markets or labor markets or, for that matter, markets for
intermediate goods such as steel or coal. Central planning, with its
attendant allocation of inputs, had replaced the market. In such an
environment, the banking system was state-owned and played a passive role in resource allocation. There were four large, specialized banks
in this era: the People’s Bank (which was both the central bank and also
had commercial bank branches in various cities), the Agricultural Bank
(which confined its commercial banking functions to the rural areas
of the country), the Construction Bank (which managed the government’s infrastructure construction projects), and the Bank of China
(which focused on foreign exchange transactions). A little less than a
decade after economic reforms had begun the government announced
that China was to develop a complete market system in both labor
and financial markets. Since then, enormous progress has occurred.
The Shanghai stock exchange reopened in 1986 after having been shut
down in 1949. The People’s Bank became China’s central bank in 1983,
which, after some missteps in the mid-1980s, has matured as an independent institution charged with the conduct of monetary policy.
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More than one-half of the total banking assets in China today are
controlled by four commercial banks, all successors to the specialized banks mentioned above. All four have been privatized or are in
the process of being privatized, and all have minority shares owned
by U.S., Japanese, and European banks. China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization in 2001 has necessitated the restructuring of the
four banks and has opened them up to foreign ownership.
The first phase lasted about fifteen years and saw the old system
undergo a stunning transformation that changed the incentive structure and created competition over large segments of the economy. In
the fall of 1992, Premier Deng Xiaoping undertook his famous “Southern Tour” to mobilize support for even greater reform. There has been
even more profound change, including the formal endorsement by
the 14th Party Congress in November 1993 of a socialist market economy as the end goal of transition. In the last decade there has been a
greater emphasis on the coordination of reform measures; the Party
has amended the Chinese constitution to put private business on the
same footing as publicly owned businesses; and the Party has moved
to create a rule-based market system. All of this has occurred in a oneparty Communist state that has maintained political stability.
II. Lessons from the Chinese Case
Unlike the situation in some other countries (India for instance), there
was no crisis in China that required reform at that particular time.
Living standards had grown steadily, if slowly, since the early 1950s
and there were no acute economic problems. Nonetheless, the political leadership turned to reform “because they were seeking to deliver
more of the rewards of economic growth to the Chinese people in
order to solidify their political position.”6 After more than twentyfive years of economic reforms and spectacular growth over the entire
period, it is clear that the reform process has been robust and steadily
moving toward greater integration with the world. Scholars will
debate whether the reform process was choreographed with a longterm vision of how it should unfold or even if there was a clear sense of
reform objectives. Yet there can be little doubt that the reform process
reflected a steady commitment to a market system, even if that was
couched in phrases such as a “market system with Chinese characteristics.” The early success with changing the reward and incentive
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structure in agriculture reinforced the institutional change that lay at
the heart of the Chinese transition.
As far as I can tell, however, China’s reform history evolved piecemeal in the beginning, with no strong evidence that the reformers had
already conceptualized in any detail a target system. Instead, the early
reform measures were intended to address some specific malady in
the existing economic institutions and incentive structures. Then these
measures, especially when they resulted in quick successes and when
they were seen as creating many gainers and few, if any, losers, in
turn precipitated other reform measures. Inevitably, and not entirely
unexpectedly, when unanticipated consequences arose the government put into place corrective measures. Important reforms, such as
the establishment of special economic zones or the introduction of the
household responsibility system in agriculture, were first introduced at
local levels of government rather than at the central government. They
rested on a crucial institutional feature of the economic and political
governance structure that was federalism, Chinese style.7 Numerous
scholars have noted that the approach to reform reflected a Chinese
saying meaning “crossing a river by groping the stones.”
The overwhelming evidence from recent decades is that those countries that have moved up on the scale of economic prosperity have
been more open to the rest of the world. The rapid growth of exports
has characterized these successful countries. China is an outstanding
example. China’s early reforms were incremental, to be sure, but they
were uniformly directed towards strengthening the “market track”
while holding the “plan track” on a tight leash. The authorities were
less inclined to design the “perfect” institution and proceeded with
making changes to existing institutions incrementally; they were not
hamstrung by the theory of the “second best” that posits that in an
economy characterized by many economic distortions, the removal of
any one distortion will not necessarily improve social welfare. However, even before the first decade of reform was over, the government
had a fairly comprehensive view of both the road to reform and the
target system at the end of the road.
III. Challenges for the Future
China is a unique experiment in modern political economy. The evolution of its political system has lagged considerably behind its economic
changes even as its transition to a modern market economy has come
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a long way. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in some Eastern European countries undergoing transition. But a transition is not
a full event; it is a process. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that,
broadly speaking, the country’s economic growth since reforms began
has completely transformed the lives of its citizens, and its economy
exhibits many of the features of a modern market economy. The Communist Party of China has certainly taken seriously its social contract
to improve the lives of the population. Rural China has also undergone
great transformation; grain output has increased significantly more
rapidly than the country’s population. There has been an impressive
reduction in rural poverty. At the beginning of reforms more than 250
million people lived under the poverty line; this figure has now fallen
to less than 40 million.
Despite all of these achievements, China’s gross domestic product
is still about one-ninth of United States’ GDP. To provide some perspective on this comparative number, it is interesting to note that, in
1950, Germany’s GDP was about one-fifth of U.S. GDP and Japan’s
GDP was one-eighth of U.S. GDP.8 China was admitted to the World
Trade Organization in 2001 after nearly a decade of preparation. Its
tariffs and non-tariff barriers have come down considerably and the
domestic prices of traded goods have moved gradually closer to world
levels. The ratio of total trade to total output is now about 40 percent
and China is more fully integrated into the world economy than ever
before. However, the national average figure described above masks
rather large differences in openness and trade orientation across provinces. The southern and eastern provinces are far more open, have
received the bulk of foreign investments, and have prospered more as
compared to the northwest and southwest provinces.
China’s early reformers and its current leadership are still feeling
their way, as they must, continuously adjusting and tweaking their
pathway to a complete market-based system. Even if China is a special
case—and in many ways it is special by virtue of its sheer size and its
economic structure when it actually embarked on the path to reform—
there are lessons to be drawn from its relatively successful evolution.
There is growing concern about income and wealth inequalities
within urban areas, between urban and rural areas, and between the
southern and coastal provinces (where a great deal of modernization
has occurred) and the relatively less developed western and northern
provinces. The Gini coefficient for China is estimated at about 0.42,
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which is approximately in the middle of Gini values for countries at
about the same level of real per capita income.9 Even so, for purposes
of internal political stability, the growing inequality has received attention at the highest levels of government. The government is investing
more in the poorer areas and also in people in those areas, to enable
them to make the transition to market-oriented labor markets.
Housing wealth is a major component of total wealth in urban
China. There is some evidence that there is a housing bubble in the
major urban areas. The government has moved in recent months to
curb speculation in housing prices: it has raised the down payment
requirements to 30 percent (from 20 percent) for apartments exceeding
90 square meters and it has raised the transactions tax on apartments
that are sold within five years of purchase.
As noted above, an exciting transition is underway in China both
in economic terms and in its political makeup. Everyone interested in
world affairs should watch it with great interest. 
•
Notes
1. The Macalester group traveled to Taipei (Taiwan), Nanjing, and Shanghai. I also traveled to Beijing to meet economists at Peking University. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Xu
Li and Dr. Yang Wenhai for very fruitful discussions about the reforms in China and for
their warmth and generosity. I learned much from them that I expect will inform my
own teaching in the years ahead.
2. A change is Pareto-improving if it improves the existing situation for some people but
does not make anyone worse off; see Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland,
“Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 1 (February 2003): 120–143.
3. The household responsibility system was an institutional innovation that arose at
the grassroots level. A small group of farmers in a commune in Anhui Province is said
to have first proposed the system well before it became widely adopted. It received
quick approval by the provincial governor but the central government opposed it. See
Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li, “The Lessons of China’s Transition to a Market
Economy,” Cato Journal 16, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 201–231.
4. Xiao-Yuan Dong and Louis Putterman, “Soft Budget Constraints, Social Burdens, and
Labor Redundancy in China’s State Industry,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 1
(March 2003): 110–133.
5. Gregory Chow, China’s Economic Transformation (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers,
2002), p. 306.
6. Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: China’s Economic Reform 1978–1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 61.
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7. John M. Litwack and Yingyi Qian, “Balanced or Unbalanced Development: Special
Economic Zones as Catalysts for Transition,” Journal of Comparative Economics 26, no. 1
(March 1998): 1–25.
8. David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale, “China Takes Off,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6
(November–December 2003): 36–53.
9. The Gini coefficient is a convenient measure of the extent of inequality in an income
distribution. It is based on how much income goes to particular segments of the income
distribution. The data for the Gini coefficient come from the World Bank.

280

